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The Evolution of Manor Courts in Medieval England, c.1250-1350: the 
Evidence of the Personal Actions 
 
Chris Briggs and Phillipp R. Schofield 
 
Abstract 
Manor courts held by landlords for their tenants and other local people existed in their 
thousands across medieval England. These courts played a significant role in the everyday lives 
of villagers, formed a major site for the preservation of law and order, and have been studied 
by generations of historians. Yet room for debate remains concerning the character of these 
institutions in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and the influences that proved 
most important for their evolution. This article uses a new database concerning hundreds of 
manorial personal actions – lawsuits which treated areas roughly equivalent to modern tort and 
contract law – to explore the procedures and practices of the manor courts, and to reconstruct 
their development over the first century for which detailed records of their proceedings survive. 
It is argued that although significant local variation among manor courts persisted, especially 
in the west of England, overall there was a broad process of ‘convergence’. Yet this was not 
simply a top-down process involving the transmission of practices from the king’s courts of 
common law, or the communication of external rules by legal professionals or landlords. 
Instead, the suitors, litigants and jurors of the manor courts played a decisive role in this 
process. The manorial personal actions thus provide an important instance of the fundamental 
role of experienced laypeople in simultaneously shaping and exploiting key institutions of 






Throughout medieval England, landlords held courts on their manors several times a year. 
These courts, many thousands in number, were attended by the lords’ manorial tenants and 
other local people, and from the 1240s onwards they kept written records of their own 
proceedings. Although they had existed for a long time prior to that decade, and continued to 
do so for several centuries after the Black Death, during the century under examination here 
the manor courts collectively were arguably at the height of their importance in terms of their 
impact on the ordinary inhabitants of rural England. Generations of historians have studied 
these courts and the court rolls which provide the primary record of their multifarious 
activities.1 Yet what exactly was the character of these institutions in the later thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries? Commentators from F.W. Maitland onwards have agreed that 
manor courts underwent significant changes during this period, but what were the nature and 
causes of these changes?2 What sorts of procedures and practices did manor courts follow, and 
what kind of law did they observe? And perhaps most importantly, what was the role of the 
                                                          
1 For a survey of historical approaches to the peasantry, including court roll-based studies, P.R. 
Schofield, Peasants and Historians. Debating the Medieval English Peasantry,Manchester, 
2016; also Z. Razi and R.M. Smith, ‘Introduction: The Historiography of Manorial Court 
Rolls’, in Z. Razi and R. Smith, eds., Medieval Society and the Manor Court, Oxford, 1996, 1-
35. 
2 F.W. Maitland, ed., Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts, Selden Society 
vol. 2, London, 1889; F.W. Maitland and W.P. Baildon, eds., The Court Baron,  Selden Society, 
vol. 4, London, 1890. 
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many thousands of villagers, most of them unfree villeins, in shaping institutions of which they 
were the most important users? 
 Although historians have for many decades pondered the nature of the medieval manor 
court, considerable uncertainty and disagreement remain. All participants in the debate 
recognize the important fact that the manor courts were in many ways not really ‘courts’ in the 
modern sense at all. Their business was remarkably diverse. The courts were used, for example, 
to enforce the landlord’s rights over his tenants (especially his unfree villein tenants), to 
regulate agrarian routines, and to track and register transfers of customary (or villein) land. 
These areas of activity were primarily concerned with the landlord’s interest in the control of 
people and resources, and were as much administrative or political as legal. Yet the manor 
courts were also the setting for another large category of business, namely that which concerned 
interpersonal or civil interactions and disputes between peasant litigants covering a wide range 
of matters. Although these generated some curial revenue for the lord, his interest in litigation 
and interaction between peasant suitors was much more indirect. In the period under 
consideration, however, this represented a lively and growing area of court activity which was 
much more obviously legal in nature. Thus it is not surprising that discussion over the 
institutional character of the manor court has largely, though not exclusively, been conducted 
in relation to this area of business. 
 It is possible to point to two main issues on which this debate has focused. First, how 
far did individual manor courts exhibit distinctive paths of legal development, rather than all 
moving in a broadly similar manner towards a shared destination? This theme is nicely summed 
up by the title of an essay by Helmholz, which examines the tension between ‘independence’ 
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and ‘uniformity’ in medieval England’s manorial courts.3 A second, related question is, how 
intense was the influence of the king’s courts of common law on the ‘feudal’ courts of manorial 
lords? With their roots in twelfth-century legal reforms, the reach and scope of the common 
law courts was significant and growing during this period. Few would disagree strongly with 
Paul Brand’s judgement that ‘well before 1300 the law of the king’s courts had bedded in as 
England’s national law and had come to be accepted as such not only by justices and lawyers 
but also by laymen and by litigants’.4 Those who have favoured the notion of ‘uniformity’ 
among manor courts have usually seen as its cause the growing influence of the common law 
on manorial law, as the principles of the former entered the latter through a process of ‘trickle 
down’.5 
 This has been a varied and nuanced debate, and just a few key contributions can be 
picked out here, starting with those that have stressed uniformity and common law influence. 
Beckerman’s landmark comparison of the earliest records of manor court proceedings with 
those of the fourteenth century revealed marked contrasts in the basic procedures used, and a 
convergence in practices. Among the key changes he identified were a rise in the importance 
                                                          
3 R.H. Helmholz, ‘Independence and Uniformity in England’s Manorial Courts’, in L. 
Bonfield, ed., Seigneurial Jurisdiction (Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-
American Legal History 21), Berlin, 2000. This important study has considerably influenced 
the approach taken here. 
4 P. Brand, ‘The English Medieval Common Law (to c.1307) as a System of National 
Institutions and Legal Rules: Creation and Functioning’, in P. Dresch and H. Skoda, eds., 
Legalism: Anthropology and History, Oxford, 2012, 195. 
5 For this expression, see e.g. L.R. Poos, ‘Medieval English Manorial Courts: Their Records 
and their Jurisdiction’, in Bonfield, ed., Seigneurial Jurisdiction, 197. 
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of juries, and a growing dependence on the written records of the court as evidence.6 Although 
he did not see those changes as necessarily the result of manor courts imitating the king’s 
courts, elsewhere Beckerman has expressed sympathy for the view that a standardization of 
procedure and administration took place in later thirteenth-century manor courts which was in 
part due to the influence of the developing common law.7 Smith argued that new types of 
conveyance of customary land emerged in the later thirteenth century which were modelled on 
common law forms.8 In a similar vein, Razi and Smith again placed emphasis on external 
influences on manorial jurisdictions by stressing competition with the popular royal courts as 
an explanation for the emergence of manorial court rolls as a written record, and for the internal 
development of manor court procedures.9 Finally, perhaps the most all-embracing expression 
of this view is that of Hyams, who argued that ‘common-law influence on manorial courts 
shines out as soon as one asks of the court rolls serious questions about procedure and custom’, 
                                                          
6 J.S. Beckerman ‘Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in Medieval English 
Manorial Courts’, 10 Law and History Review (1992), 197. 
7 J.S. Beckerman, ‘Towards a Theory of Medieval Manorial Adjudication: the Nature of 
Communal Judgements in a System of Customary Law’, 13 Law and History Review (1995), 
11, 15-16. 
8 See e.g. R.M. Smith, ‘Some Thoughts on “Hereditary” and “Proprietary” Rights in Land 
under Customary Law in Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England’, 1 Law and 
History Review (1983), 95; R.M. Smith, ‘The English Peasantry, 1250-1650’, in T. Scott, ed., 
The Peasantries of Europe from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, London and New 
York, 1998, esp. 350-355. 
9 Z. Razi and R.M. Smith, ‘The Origins of the English Manorial Court Rolls as a Written 
Record: a Puzzle’, in Razi and Smith, eds., Medieval Society and the Manor Court. 
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and introduced the notion of coercion into explanations of such influence, claiming that ‘all 
courtholders at whatever level were well aware of a royal determination to subordinate their 
jurisdictions to the common law’.10 
 Turning to the other side of the debate, Lloyd Bonfield has been the most vocal 
opponent of the argument for curial uniformity and the absorption of common law forms and 
practices into manorial jurisdictions. Reflecting on a substantial sample of cases relating mainly 
to customary land litigation taken from a wide range of different court roll series, Bonfield 
argued that it was a mistake to regard customary law - the laws and procedures of manor courts 
– as a system of rules which ‘cloned’ the English common law. Indeed, he has even suggested 
that, logically, the reverse was just as possible in certain circumstances, i.e. that the common 
law followed principles of customary law.11 
                                                          
10 P.R. Hyams, ‘What did Edwardian Villagers Understand by “Law”?’, in Razi and Smith, 
eds., Medieval Society and the Manor Court, 79-80, 86, emphasis added. For an argument 
concerning the emergence of an English legal ‘system’ resulting from deliberate efforts of the 
royal courts to dominate and control, and the place of the seigniorial courts in this process, see 
P. Brand, ‘The Formation of the English Legal System, 1150-1400’, in A. Padoa-Schioppa, 
ed., Legislation and Justice, Oxford, 1996. 
11 L. Bonfield, ‘What did Edwardian Villagers Mean by “Customary Law”?’, in Razi and 
Smith, eds., Medieval Society and the Manor Court; L. Bonfield, ‘The Role of Seigneurial 
Jurisdiction after the Norman Conquest and the Nature of Customary Law in Medieval 
England’ in Bonfield, ed., Seigneurial Jurisdiction; these studies draw on L.R. Poos and L. 
Bonfield, eds., Select Cases in Manorial Courts, 1250-1550. Property and Family Law, Selden 
Society vol. 114, London, 1998. 
7 
 
Debate on these issues was especially intense in the 1990s, and has died down 
somewhat since. The present article seeks to move matters forward by re-examining the 
question of ‘independence or uniformity’ via the evidence of the personal actions. Attention 
thus far has tended to focus most on manorial disputes about rights to real property, but much 
more numerous in the records were the personal actions, which treated areas roughly equivalent 
to modern tort and contract law. In taking a close look at a major yet neglected area of manor 
court business that promises to reveal much about the institution’s legal character, this study 
draws on crucial new evidence contained in a large database of hundreds of cases taken 
systematically from a large number of surviving manor court records.12 Although previous 
commentators on manor courts have often made use of unpublished materials from a wide 
range of manors, there has often been a temptation to pick out revealing cases without seeking 
to establish the presence, absence or frequency of key court roll entries. Our overall aim is to 
assess the degree of homogeneity among the manor courts, and the evidence for external 
influence upon them, before offering closer consideration of the possible mechanisms through 
which the courts may have absorbed such influences. Ultimately, this matters because of what 
it reveals about the legal experiences and agency of medieval England’s rural population. 
 
II. The Manor Courts and the Personal Actions 
The personal actions allowed claimants to bring lawsuits, initiated via an oral plaint and usually 
without a fee, to recover unpaid debts or detained goods and to win damages for various wrongs 
and broken agreements. Expediting these lawsuits – implementing court orders, securing 
parties’ appearances, empanelling juries, and so on - was the responsibility of the manorial 
tenants who served as court officials. Maitland called the manorial jurisdiction over personal 
                                                          
12 See below, n. 19 and Appendix.  
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actions ‘a useful, thriving reality’.13 Some courts heard numbers of such lawsuits that were 
surprisingly large given the relatively small populations under their jurisdictions. An example 
is the Norfolk village of Bressingham, where sixty-six different personal actions involving 
approximately eighty-five individuals were pending before the manor court in the calendar year 
1316, but there were many other less busy courts which heard ten or twenty actions annually, 
though a few heard none at all.14 
The subject matter of the personal actions was diverse. Court rolls from manors all over 
the country abound with plaints related to assaults and beatings, slander, goods carried away, 
damage to crops and animals, and failed agreements of many different kinds. The king’s courts 
of common law also exercised jurisdiction over personal actions, and indeed, trespass was one 
of the areas in which royal court jurisdiction expanded in the second half of the thirteenth 
century. However, it was never intended that the royal courts would become the primary 
jurisdiction for the lesser civil business that was the stuff of manorial personal actions.15 
Furthermore, the manor courts provided remedies for complaints where the common law did 
not, the most important being broken agreements made without a written deed.16 It is true that 
                                                          
13 F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2 
vols., 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1898, vol. 1, 587. 
14 Bressingham: Norfolk Record Office, WAR 7-8. 
15 Maitland and Baildon, eds., Court Baron, 115-117; J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English 
Legal History, 3rd ed., London, 1990, 26-27, 72. 
16 D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Oxford, 1999, 24; J.S. 
Beckerman, ‘Customary Law in English Manorial Courts in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 




the manor courts did not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the lesser personal actions, since 
such business could also be heard by other local tribunals, most notably the borough courts, 
church courts, county courts, and hundred courts. Nonetheless, the manor courts and these other 
local jurisdictions remained a leading venue for this very important category of lawsuit, and 
for litigation involving a huge number of individual participants.17 As noted above, the total of 
sixty-six cases in progress in 1316 at Bressingham was probably above the average for a manor 
court at this time. However, even if we assume that ten was a more typical number, it is still 
realistic to imagine that significantly more than 10,000 personal actions were heard in the 
manor courts of Norfolk alone in that year.18 And although it is impossible to measure, our 
strong impression is that the number of personal actions begun in the manor courts collectively 
each year increased over the first century for which court rolls are available. 
The manor courts’ jurisdiction over personal actions thus played a major role in the 
maintenance of law and order in this period, broadly defined. Virtually anyone, and not just 
servile or customary tenants of the manor, could sue or be sued in a manorial personal action. 
Litigation about debts, contracts and trespasses therefore involved many more people than did 
the rarer lawsuits about real property, which concerned the manor’s customary tenants only. 
                                                          
17 As is explained below, the manor courts did not compete directly with the royal courts in 
this area owing to the forty-shilling jurisdictional limit. 
18 This calculation is based on the assumption that each of the 1,362 Norfolk lordships or 
manors recorded in the Nomina Villarum of 1316 operated a manor court, and that the average 
number of personal actions dealt with in each of those courts in that year was ten; see W.J. 
Blake, ‘Norfolk Manorial Lords in 1316. Part II’, 30 Norfolk Archaeology (1952), 265. Note 




For large sections of the population, participation in or witness of civil litigation in the manor 
court formed one of their most important encounters with the formal structures of law. As 
already noted, however, manorial jurisdiction over debts, trespasses and broken contracts was 
not exclusive, and many of those involved in manorial personal actions undoubtedly had 
experience of conducting similar kinds of litigation in royal and other non-manorial courts. 
In order to find out how manorial personal actions developed over the first century for 
which we have court rolls, we draw mainly on a database of hundreds of personal actions 
recorded in 103 different court roll series relating to manors both lay and ecclesiastical, situated 
in five counties in eastern England and five in the west (see Appendix).19 As already noted, our 
aim is to assess the evidence for uniformity of practice and the role of external influence in this 
area of the courts’ work. Though we are especially interested in the influence of the royal 
courts, we have chosen not to frame this enquiry in terms of the question ‘did manor courts 
follow the common law in the conduct of personal actions?’. The contents of the manor court 
records and those of the contemporary common law courts undoubtedly often look similar 
when placed alongside each other, since they share features like the categorization of cases 
according to ‘form of action’ (‘plea of debt’, ‘plea of trespass’ and so on), or the use of 
analogous terminology in the enrolment of pleadings.20 Yet moving beyond the identification 
of such broad similarities to attempt an exhaustive exploration of the degree to which one sector 
drove the other is a very different proposition, with no guarantee of a clear result.21 Instead, we 
                                                          
19 Of this total, two are composite court roll series, each of which contains the records of court 
sessions from multiple manors.  
20 Helmholz, ‘Independence and Uniformity’, 226-228; Hyams, ‘Edwardian Villagers’, 80. 




take a more targeted and pragmatic approach. We first consider the extent to which those 
involved in manorial personal actions emphasized the limits to manorial jurisdiction based on 
knowledge of the wider legal landscape (section III). In section IV, we offer an overview of 
the degree of ‘convergence’ of practice evident among manor courts in both east and west. 
Then, in section V, we briefly consider how far the uniformity we have traced was the result 
of intervention by central authority. Finally, section VI turns to other, less deliberately top-
down external influences on the manorial personal actions, evaluating the role of lawyers 
alongside that of knowledgeable laypeople. 
 
III. Jurisdictional Boundaries 
The first step is to ask how far the various actors in manorial litigation understood there to be 
clear limitations to the competence of their own jurisdictions with respect to personal actions. 
Even a cursory consideration of the personal actions brought in different manor courts shows 
that, in very broad terms, they all involved the same kinds of subject matter. But a closer look 
at this issue is important, since it is hard to argue for homogeneity among manor courts if there 
were significant divergences from place to place in the kinds of disputes that could be 
prosecuted. To investigate this, we focus first on lawsuits in which litigants raised arguments 
about the limits of manorial jurisdiction. We then move on to examine the forty-shilling 
jurisdictional ceiling on all manorial personal actions, and the degree to which it was 
understood and applied in the courts we have studied. Overall, the evidence suggests that courts 
possessed a strong and largely uniform understanding of the division of jurisdiction between 
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manorial and other kinds of tribunal (including royal courts) with regard to interpersonal 
disputes.22 
 In the first pair of manorial cases under review, the defendants argued that their courts 
were not competent to act. In 1288 at Aldham (Suffolk), Sampson de Audham brought three 
separate trespass actions against Alice le Wolf.23 In the second of these, Sampson complained 
that Alice and ‘unknown men’ had, ‘with force and arms and against the peace’, carried away 
thorns and briars from his land. In her defence Alice asserted that ‘this court does not have the 
power to hear pleas pleaded against the peace’, and asked for a judgment on this point. 
However, a decision of the ‘whole court’ went against Alice, and Sampson recovered his 
property and an award of damages. Alice’s defence almost certainly sprang from an awareness 
that civil actions of trespass which alleged the use of force and arms and a breach of the king’s 
peace could only be prosecuted by writ in the royal courts.24 This defence presumably failed 
                                                          
22 This statement must be qualified to take account of the ‘ancient demesne’ manors, several 
of which feature among those investigated for this study. Ancient demesne manors had formed 
part of the royal estate at the time of Edward the Confessor. One of their characteristics was 
that they were not bound by the forty-shilling jurisdictional limit: see E. Clark, ‘Debt litigation 
in a late medieval English vill’, in J.A. Raftis, ed., Pathways to medieval peasants, Toronto, 
1981, 252; M.K. McIntosh, Autonomy and Community: the Royal Manor of Havering, 1200-
1500, Cambridge, 1986, 194. However, it must be said that this feature is not very apparent in 
the litigation records for such manors studied here. 
23 Court of 1 June 1288, Cambridge University Library, Vanneck MSS, Box 1 Roll 1, m. 21. 
24 Beckerman, ‘Customary Law’, 188-196; Baker, Introduction, 72. For further discussion of 
contra pacem, see P.R. Schofield, ‘Trespass Litigation in the Manor Court in the Late 
Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries’, in R. Goddard, J. Langdon and M. Müller, eds., 
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because Sampson had alleged only a breach of the peace, and not of the king’s peace.25 
Nonetheless, the case shows an awareness of a division of jurisdictional responsibility over 
civil actions of trespass, and hence of the relationship between manor and royal courts. 
 Similar issues arose in July 1311 in the manor court of Essington (Staffordshire) when 
William Phelip sued Robert Mek. William alleged that at a session of the manor court the 
previous month, Robert had called him a thief, thereby subjecting him to ‘scandal’ in breach 
of the lord’s peace.26 Robert stated that he was not required to respond, since William’s plaint 
was ‘as in a case of felony, of which this court cannot have cognizance’. He sought judgment, 
but the court’s decision has not survived. It is not entirely clear whether Robert was claiming 
that the alleged slander was itself a felony, or that the plaintiff’s claim had been made in the 
same manner as an accusation (or ‘appeal’) of felony. This uncertainty does not invalidate the 
essential point, though, which is that the defendant knew that the manor court did not have the 
authority to try a serious crime, or felony, since (although Robert does not appear to have made 
this point explicitly) such matters fell exclusively under royal jurisdiction.27 
                                                          
Survival and Discord in Medieval Society. Essays in Honour of Christopher Dyer, Turnhout, 
2010, 153. 
25 In the first of his three actions, Sampson alleged a trespass ‘against the peace of the earl [i.e. 
of Oxford, the lord of the manor]’, and it was perhaps the omission of this in Sampson’s second 
plaint which led Alice to attempt her defence. 
26 Essington, court of 2 July 1311, Phelip v Mek, Staffordshire Record Office, D1790/C/69, m. 
1v, m. 2 v. The lord of the manor at this date was apparently one Robert of Essington. 
27 For similar issues elsewhere, see a plea of trespass at Norton Canon, in which the defendant 
argued that he owed no defence to the plaintiff’s plea because the plaintiff had presented his 
case in a manner that related to the jurisdiction of the crown rather than a trespass (quia in 
14 
 
 These are not the only cases which show awareness at village level of the boundary 
between manorial and royal jurisdiction. At Coltishall (Norfolk) in 1290 Richard de Erford 
sued Peter de Coudessale (i.e. Coltishall), claiming that Peter had dug up his vegetation, carried 
it away and detained it.28 Peter’s defence was that the vegetation had been growing on his own 
free tenement. Peter sought judgment on whether ‘he was required to respond for his free 
tenement, or regarding anything growing in his free tenement, without a special mandate of the 
lord king’. The plaintiff replied that ‘this is not a plea about a free tenement, but about a trespass 
done to him’, and judgment was sought. A very similar case had been heard five years earlier 
in the manor court of Hingham, some twenty miles away.29 The plaintiff, John Selede, alleged 
that his ash trees had been carried away by the defendant. The defendant responded that the 
trees had been growing on his own land, or ‘soil’, on the day that he had carried them away. 
He stated, in a fashion similar to the Coltishall defendant, that ‘he was not bound to respond 
concerning this soil without a writ of the lord king’. Both cases reveal a keen awareness of 
                                                          
narracione narrat in modum qui tangit coronam et non transgressionem), a suggestion at least 
that the plea had touched upon matters beyond the perceived jurisdiction of the court, and 
possibly towards criminal rather than civil matters (Norton Canon, Herefordshire, court of 19 
November 1304, de Ploufeld v de Ekkel’, Hereford Cathedral Library, R899r).  
28 Coltishall, Norfolk, court of 13 May 1290, Erford v Coltishall, Cambridge, King’s College 
Archives, COL/361. The vegetation or plant at the centre of this dispute, described as succus, 
has not been identified. 




exclusive royal court jurisdiction over freehold tenements and the potential value of this 
information in mounting defences in manorial trespass litigation.30 
 The above evidence relates to arguments made by parties in their efforts to win lawsuits. 
In pointing to the jurisdictional boundaries between manorial and royal courts, these litigants 
were not seeking to enunciate general rules, nor were they necessarily making claims that 
would have commanded universal agreement. Indeed, as we have seen, some of their 
arguments about jurisdiction failed. However, this does not invalidate the observation that there 
are substantial indications in the manorial litigation we have studied of significant knowledge 
of the respective jurisdictional competences of the manor courts and the royal courts. In 
disputing about these issues, litigants clearly recognized the capacity of the manor courts’ 
jurisdiction within a larger network of courts. 
Also relevant to the question of jurisdictional competence is the issue of the forty-
shilling limit in personal actions. This is a confusing topic characterized by scholarly 
uncertainty. There is general agreement about the existence by c.1290 (if not the origins) of a 
non-statutory rule which said that pleas of debt or detinue amounting to forty shillings or more 
had to be sued by writ in the king’s courts. Manorial and other lesser courts were restricted to 
debt disputes about sums below forty shillings.31 The aim of this measure seems to have been 
to reserve the more important and thus more profitable disputes for the king’s courts. 
Additionally, chapter 8 of the Statute of Gloucester (1278) made the provision that no-one 
should in future have a writ of trespass before the justices (i.e. in the king’s court) unless he 
declared on oath that the goods taken away were worth at least forty shillings. The objective of 
                                                          
30 For another very similar (and very early) example, see Redgrave, Suffolk, court of 11 June 
1260, Dusing v Wodewell, University of Chicago Joseph Regenstein Library, Bacon MS 1. 
31 Merchants, exceptionally, were not bound by the rule. 
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this measure was probably to keep petty disputes out of the royal courts. The traditional view 
of the Statute of Gloucester provision was that it was understood by contemporaries to restrict 
the jurisdiction of local courts to forty shillings in all kinds of personal actions, even though 
that is not what the statute said. In 1975 Beckerman adopted a contrary view, however, arguing 
that the forty-shilling rule in debt-detinue and the statute’s provision concerning trespass must 
be regarded as separate matters, and that after 1278 local courts retained the power to hear 
trespass actions in which more than forty shillings was claimed.32 
Clearly, where the forty-shilling jurisdictional limit is concerned we are dealing with 
rules affecting manor courts that emanated from the common law, though as is apparent from 
the previous paragraph, it is difficult to argue that those framing the rules intended to give 
comprehensive and unambiguous direction to manor courts concerning the size of the civil 
claims they were allowed to hear. Even if contemporaries took chapter 8 of the Statute of 
Gloucester to demonstrate an upper limit on manorial trespass claims involving the taking away 
of goods, doubt must have remained about the position with other kinds of trespass claim and 
with covenants, about the importance of damages claims (as opposed to goods taken away), 
and so on. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that our research in the manorial court rolls has 
revealed a fairly consistent broad understanding among litigants from c.1290 that a forty-
shilling jurisdictional limit existed across the board in personal actions. One can certainly find 
                                                          
32 Key discussions include J. Beckerman, ‘The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval 
English Personal Actions’, in D. Jenkins, ed., Legal History Studies, London, 1975; Helmholz, 
‘Independence and Uniformity’, 220-221; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the 
Common Law, 2nd ed., London, 1981, 244-245; R.C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval 
England, 1150-1350, Princeton, 1982, 240-263. 
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cases in which more than forty shillings was successfully claimed without opposition.33 
However, such cases are not common, and defendants sometimes invoked the forty-shilling 
rule to explain why they need not answer a particular charge, or ensured that their claims did 
not exceed forty shillings, as in instances where the sum claimed came to 39s 113/4d.34 
The material on the forty-shilling limit thus lends further weight to the view that the 
local litigation we have examined generally presents a shared understanding of the boundaries 
to manorial jurisdiction over personal actions, especially in relation to the royal courts. 
Furthermore, there is little sign of chronological change or regional variation in the arguments 
litigants made on this topic. Throughout the period under consideration, well-informed 
manorial litigants made arguments that imply a common understanding of the overall 
competence of the manor courts. Yet this still leaves huge scope for local diversity from court 
to court in legal procedures, and it is to this that we turn in the next section. 
 
IV. Convergence Among Manor Courts 
                                                          
33 For instance, Wymondham, Norfolk (Groshagh manor), court of 12 Dec. 1296, Clericus v 
de Brathweyt et al., Norfolk Record Office, NRS 18476 (successful plea in detinue for sixty 
shillings).  
34 E.g. Heacham, Norfolk, court of 24 March 1298, Sapling v de Torp, Norfolk Record Office, 
Le Strange, DA2 (defence based on plea exceeding forty-shilling jurisdictional limit); 
Woolhope, Herefordshire, court of 30 July 1308, de la Hyde v Folemore et al., Hereford 
Cathedral Library, R750, m. 2r,v (defence based on damages claim in trespass exceeding forty 
shillings); Alrewas, Staffordshire, court of 19 May 1330, Tymmore v Nicholas, Staffordshire 
Record Office, D/W/O/3/13, m. 10 r (example of a sum claimed just below the forty-shillings 
limit; interestingly this was an ancient demesne manor). 
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In assessing the extent of ‘convergence’ among manor courts in this period, it is essential to 
distinguish as far as possible between underlying practices and procedures on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the written forms used to record these in the court roll. Similar procedures 
could be written up in different ways. It is clear that the earliest manorial court rolls - i.e., those 
of the period c.1255-c.1275 - are often strikingly different from, and much more diverse than, 
those of Edward II’s reign (1307-27) and later.35 Where the personal actions in particular are 
concerned it is also easy to detect a marked development and convergence in recording 
practices over this period. While the records of personal litigation of the 1250s to 1270s often 
appear to be haphazard notes on a largely oral process, those of the later period were clearly 
intended as a full record of each stage of a plaint to which subsequent reference could be made, 
as and when necessary.36 If a broad convergence in the format of recording is clear, however, 
to what extent can one identify a similar convergence in underlying curial procedures? 
 Here, too, existing scholarship would lead one to expect most manor courts to have 
been developing in the same general direction in this period. In particular, as noted above, 
Beckerman’s influential comparison of the earliest records of manor court proceedings with 
those of the fourteenth century revealed marked contrasts in the basic procedures used. Among 
the key changes were a rise in the importance of juries of presentment and trial in the conduct 
of business at the expense of the entire homage or body of court suitors and older forms of trial 
such as compurgation (an oath-swearing ritual, usually involving a defendant denying all or 
part of a plantiff’s claim with the assistance of ‘oath-helpers’), and a growing dependence on 
                                                          
35 See e.g. Poos, ‘Medieval English Manorial Courts: Their Records and their Jurisdiction’, 
198-199. 
36 C. Briggs and P.R. Schofield, ‘Understanding Edwardian Villagers’ Use of Law: Some 
Manor Court Litigation Evidence’, 40 Reading Medieval Studies (2014), 117. 
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the written records of the court as evidence in disputes.37 These broad changes affected all 
aspects of the manor courts’ work. Where the conduct of personal actions is concerned, the 
most important of these changes is the shift to jury trial, which, it is argued, was increasingly 
seen as a more rational and attractive mode of trial than compurgation.38 
 We undertook a systematic analysis of the records of a large number of manor courts 
in an effort to determine how far individual courts followed the same basic procedures in 
personal actions. Attention is restricted to the seventy-four court roll series (out of the total of 
103) in which the records of a minimum of ten court sessions survive, and in which the entries 
dealing with personal actions have been searched in an attempt to locate at least one recorded 
instance of each of five common procedures encountered in personal actions.39 These 
procedures were: (i) jury trial; (ii) use of compurgation as a mode of trial (see above); (iii) use 
of an essoin, or formal excuse for non-attendance, made for a party by an ‘essoiner’; (iv) 
employment of mesne process to compel the appearance of a defendant (counted as one or 
more of the three steps of summons, attachment or distraint); and (v) enforcement of a court 
judgment, indicated by a statement that the court will act to ‘levy’ a debt or damages awarded 
to the plaintiff. The Appendix indicates whether or not these features could be traced in the 
surviving records of each court. 
 The results should be treated with caution, since the surviving series have a wide range 
of different start dates, and are available for periods of greatly varying length. Overall, while 
                                                          
37 Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’. 
38 For the perceived advantages of trial juries over compurgation, see Beckerman, ‘Customary 
Law’, 20-38. 




there is evidence of convergence among manor courts with respect to procedure in personal 
actions, we should first note that this was not pronounced everywhere. While the manor courts 
operated using fundamentally the same set of procedures when prosecuting personal actions, 
an important point to which we will return, they were in no sense identical.40 Manors in the 
western region appear to have been less uniform than those in the east of England. Instances of 
all five categories of procedure could be traced for just ten out of the thirty-eight western court 
roll series examined. This proportion was much higher in the east, where all but six of the 
thirty-six series studied yielded an example of each of the five aspects of procedure, and those 
six fell short on just one element. Such evidence does seem to reflect a deeper regional contrast 
between western and eastern England, which cannot be explained wholly by the fact that for 
the western region we are obliged to rely more heavily on short runs of surviving records than 
is the case for the eastern counties. 
In particular, there was a tendency among western region courts to employ either 
compurgation or jury trial, but not both (twelve series). Thus in the west, there is less support 
for a linear model in which most courts tended to move over the century under consideration 
from a reliance on compurgation to a preference for trial by jury. For one thing, there were 
manor courts, such as the de Bockleton family’s at Bockleton (Worcestershire), where there 
was significant use of compurgation but no explicit evidence at all that juries were used to 
adjudicate pleaded personal actions. Furthermore, rather than shifting over time from 
compurgation to jury trial, some western manor courts appear to have gone in the opposite 
direction. Examples include those of the cellarer of Worcester cathedral priory, and of the dean 
                                                          
40 For this theme, see especially C. Briggs, ‘Manor Court Procedures, Debt Litigation Levels, 




and chapter of Hereford at Norton Canon (Herefordshire). In both cases, compurgation was the 
predominant trial mode towards the end of the period studied. One cannot easily determine 
how far patterns in the choice of trial method reflect the preferences of specific litigants, rather 
than a deliberate curial policy to promote or prohibit either compurgation or juries, but the 
evidence is nonetheless interesting. It is also notable that certain phrases used in some of the 
more abbreviated court roll entries on litigation to describe steps in procedure are very common 
in the records of the western courts, but never appear in the east. The most notable of these are 
vadiavit emendationem and traxit curiam, and variations thereof, the former meaning roughly 
‘he [usually the defendant] pledged to make amends’, the second ‘he withdrew from court’.41 
It could be that these are just regionally specific phrases for underlying procedures with 
identical equivalents in the east, but even if this were the case (and it seems doubtful for 
vadiavit emendationem in particular), the contrasts in recording patterns are themselves 
significant. Finally, as the Appendix shows, the western courts also featured a marked tendency 
to omit explicit orders to enforce court judgments (twenty-seven series). Once again, it could 
be of course that this is simply an instance of non-recording, though the widespread character 
of this feature would perhaps support the notion that it is a real procedural difference. Overall, 
therefore, in terms of underlying procedures, the courts in the east of England appear to have 
                                                          
41 The phrase vadiavit emendationem, or variations thereof, appears in the following court roll 
series: the Worcester cellarer’s manors, Norton Canon, Farewell, Ruyton, Whitchurch, and 
Bromfield, among others; traxit curiam or similar in those of Norton Canon, Woolhope, 
Pencombe, Billingsley, Claverley, Dodington, Hilton, Whitchurch, and Bockleton, for 
instance. See Appendix for these series. 
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operated on a more uniform fashion than those in the west, and perhaps also experienced 
‘convergence’ earlier.42 
Furthermore, just because a general feature of court procedure - such as a trial by jury 
- can be shown to have been present in different courts, this does not mean that that procedure 
operated in exactly the same way in all places, or that all courts were subject to external forces 
promoting uniformity. To reconstruct such variation in detail is difficult, not only because of 
the problematic relationship between court record and underlying practice, but also because 
convincing historical accounts of a court’s procedures depend upon exhaustive analysis of 
every surviving litigation entry in its rolls.43 It is possible, however, to point to areas where 
variety among courts was especially likely. One of the most important concerned essoins. A 
surprising amount of the technical argument that was heard in litigation over personal actions 
focused on essoins: in what circumstances they could be proffered, who could proffer them, 
and what constituted a legitimate essoin. While one would not wish to claim that each manor 
court had its own unique rules on the use of essoins in personal actions, there is certainly good 
evidence that understandings of the correct procedure were highly localized. An excellent 
instance comes from Alrewas (Staffordshire), where a plaintiff successfully challenged a 
defendant’s right to enter a second essoin after having waged his law (i.e. proffered 
compurgation), on the grounds that this was not allowed ‘according to the custom of the 
manor’. At Bagots Bromley (also Staffordshire) in 1293, ‘the whole court said as its judgment 
                                                          
42 For discussion of this trait of a general consistency allied to more subtle variation in western 
manors, see also P.R. Schofield, ‘English Law and Welsh Marcher Courts in the Late-
Thirteenth and Early-Fourteenth Centuries’, in R.A. Griffiths and P.R. Schofield, eds., Wales 
and the Welsh in the Middle Ages, Cardiff, 2011. 
43 For an example, see Briggs, ‘Manor Court Procedures’. 
23 
 
that each free man may be essoined by one person both for suit [i.e. ordinary court attendance] 
and concerning a plaint touching another person’, while at West Halton (Lincolnshire) in 1313 
an argument between parties about the correct number of essoins allowed following an 
adjournment prior to the delivery of judgment in a debt case was settled by reference to the 
‘suitors of the court’.44 The phrases used in determining rules about essoins thus suggest that 
primacy was given to local usage, not external authority. 
 Importantly, though, in spite of regional differences and the scope for local variation, 
manor courts in both regions were all choosing from essentially the same procedural menu, 
and the contrasts between courts in litigation practices that are evident were often matters of 
emphasis. In terms of recording practices, moreover, the surviving records from different 
locations display the basic similarity that is familiar to all students of court rolls, and the 
impression gained is that this similarity was increasing over the period studied here. 
 
V. Control From Above? 
We have seen that manorial litigants articulated a clear notion of the place of their local manor 
courts within a wider hierarchy of jurisdictions, including royal jurisdictions. We have also 
seen that individual manor courts in this period increasingly worked in broadly the same 
fashion where personal litigation was concerned, albeit with greater local variation in western 
than in eastern England. Clearly, therefore, at least as far as the personal actions were 
concerned, manor courts were not self-contained entities operating entirely according to their 
                                                          
44 Alrewas: Adam v le Glovere, Staffordshire Record Office, D/W/O/3/21, 1 March 1337,; 
Bagots Bromley: Staffordshire Record Office, D4038/B/2/2, m. 2v, 11 April 1293; West 




own rules. But how did such broad uniformity come about? This section begins exploration of 
this issue via a brief consideration of royal legislation, and specifically, the extent to which 
royal government made efforts to impose through such legislation a common framework for 
the conduct of manorial personal actions. To this end, the published royal statutes of the period 
have been sifted, along with the relevant scholarly commentaries.45 By focusing on the statutes, 
it is possible we may miss unwritten, non-statutory decisions made in the common law courts 
which had the effect of dictating to the seigniorial courts their appropriate spheres of action or 
procedures.46 Yet it can be argued that if the central authorities were indeed taking concerted 
steps to integrate local manorial courts into a larger legal system, then legislation was an 
obvious way in which to achieve this. A mass of royal legislation dealing with a wide range of 
matters was issued in this period, most famously under Edward I.47 However, it is striking, if 
not surprising, just how little of it was concerned with the manor courts. 
Legislation of this period does not ignore the manor courts entirely. Chapters 2 and 15 
of the Statute of Marlborough of 1267 concerned rules about distraint in lords’ courts which 
                                                          
45 Especially A. Luders and others, eds., Statutes of the Realm,11 vols., London, 1810-28, vol. 
1; P. Brand, Kings, Barons and Justices: The Making and Enforcement of Legislation in 
Thirteenth-century England, Cambridge, 2003; T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I, 
Oxford, 1949. 
46 A possible instance of this, though one with only minor implications for the present 
argument, is the use after 1273 of the common law action of replevin to challenge distraints 
made in lower courts: P. Brand, The Making of the Common Law, London, 1992, 295-298.  
47 For an overview, see P. Brand, ‘English Thirteenth-Century Legislation’, in A. Romano, ed., 
Colendo Iustitiam et Iura Condendo’: Federico II Legislatore del Regno di Sicilia nell'Europa 
del Duecento: per una Storia Comparata delle Codificazioni Europee, Rome, 1997. 
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must have had some bearing on the conduct of personal actions and appear to have been 
generally observed, while chapters 19 and 22 (about pleas of wrongful judgment in a seigniorial 
court, and the oaths of free tenants, respectively) had less direct relevance to the manor court 
business that is of interest here.48 Chapter 35 of the first Statute of Westminster (1275) again 
concerned lords’ efforts to compel appearance in their courts (here called attachment, rather 
than distraint). The chapter is directly relevant to the personal actions, since it sought to limit 
certain seigniorial attachments made in interpersonal cases concerning contracts, covenants 
and trespasses.49 Finally, as we have seen, the Statute of Gloucester (1278) legislated on the 
forty-shilling jurisdictional limit in trespass. Yet overall, royal legislation touching on the 
manor courts in general and their personal actions in particular fell far short of a comprehensive 
or coherent programme. The relevant chapters form small elements in lengthy statutes which 
are primarily concerned with other very different issues. Collectively the statutes of 1267, 1275 
and 1278 imposed restrictions or standards on few areas of manorial civil litigation, and statutes 
after 1278 to the end of our period have little if anything to say about the manor courts.50 On 
virtually all aspects of law and procedure, legislation left the manor courts free to shape their 
own affairs.  
 
VI. Legal Expertise and Lay Knowledge 
                                                          
48 For the text and an extensive discussion, see Brand, Kings, Barons and Justices. 
49 Statutes of the Realm, i, 35; H. Rothwell, ed., English Historical Documents Volume III 
1189-1327, London, 1975, 406. 
50 An exception is c. 36 of Statute of Westminster II (1285), though this has little bearing on 
the personal actions. Statutes of the Realm, i, 89. 
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If the degree of deliberate formal direction of manorial affairs by centralized royal authority 
was minimal, to what extent was the civil jurisdiction of manor courts connected to the larger 
legal world by other means, specifically via the influence of lawyers and other experts who 
possessed knowledge and experience of other jurisdictional contexts?51 The examples 
presented in previous sections leave one in no doubt that manorial personal actions were 
frequently characterized by technical and at times legalistic pleading. Do such arguments reveal 
individual peasant litigants marshalling their own legal skills, or do they indicate that paid 
professionals were operating in manor courts and exerting an influence there on a scale perhaps 
hitherto unsuspected? 
 To address this question it is necessary to examine the evidence concerning stewards, 
attorneys and pleaders in the civil business of the manor courts.52 Possibly the least important 
of these figures, in terms of the degree of explicit influence over civil business, was the steward. 
The steward presided over a manor court on behalf of the lord. He had oversight of all aspects 
of the court’s work and ensured that appropriate business was dispatched correctly. From the 
thirteenth century various treatises on ‘holding manor courts’ were produced which purported 
to guide stewards on how to conduct and record business.53 Many stewards had a legal 
background and some had royal court experience. The stewards of courts in our sample 
                                                          
51 For this issue see Bonfield, ‘Role of Seigneurial Jurisdiction’, 188. 
52 P.R. Schofield, ‘Peasants, Litigation and Agency in Medieval England: the Development of 
Law in Manorial Courts in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries’, in J. Burton, 
P.R. Schofield and B. Weiler, eds., Thirteenth Century England xiv, Woodbridge, 2013. 
53 Maitland and Baildon, eds., Court Baron. 
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included common lawyers, as well as people better described as ‘local lawyers’.54 An example 
of the former is John de Cambridge (steward at Chatteris abbey’s manor of Foxton, 1306, 1316-
19), a serjeant in the court of common pleas 1309-10, and justice there 1331-34.55 An example 
of the latter is John de Barewe (d. 1335), who presided over several of Hereford dean and 
chapter’s manor courts in the years 1306-26. Beyond this role he acted, for example, for clients 
as a serjeant in the Herefordshire trailbaston sessions of 1305.56 Yet while such stewards 
presumably did much to shape the overall character of manorial business, their influence over 
the conduct of personal actions is hard to gauge. In certain respects we might assume that 
stewards were instrumental in putting in place any seigniorial initiative aimed at improving the 
quality of dispute settlement offered in manorial courts. Some stewards were clearly men of 
some significance and had links that extended far beyond the manor.57 That said, the steward 
                                                          
54 For the latter category, see P. Brand, ‘Stewards, Bailiffs and the Emerging Legal Profession 
in Later Thirteenth-Century England’, in R. Evans, ed., Lordship and Learning: Studies in 
Memory of Trevor Aston, Woodbridge, 2004. 
55 J.A. Hamilton, ‘Cambridge, Sir John (d. 1335)’, rev. Rosemary Horrox, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4564, accessed 
7 Dec 2016]. He also served as steward for the manors of St Alban’s abbey: A.E. Levett, Studies 
in Manorial History, Oxford, 1938, 105. 
56 Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, vol. vii, 474-5; P. Brand, The Origins of the English 
Legal Profession, Oxford, 1992, 140. 
57 This is not to say that stewards were invariably the most legally competent actors in their 
courts; see a case of 1344 at the commotal court at Aberchwiler, in the marcher lordship of 
Dyffryn Clwyd, where the steward, in ignorance and full view of the court, removed the seal 
from a document, thereby invalidating it until it could be repaired with supporting explanatory 
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is rarely mentioned in any context in the court rolls.. He is sometimes named in the court roll 
heading, which is how the two stewards discussed above are identified, but it is often necessary 
to resort to other estate records, where they survive, to discover the name of the steward of a 
particular manor. As far as one can tell, the role of stewards in civil litigation at least, appears 
to have been largely supervisory and, in most instances, passive. 
 More directly involved in litigation itself were attorneys and pleaders. Very rarely - in 
fact, in only three personal actions identified in research for this study - do we find reference 
to a narrator, or pleader, accompanying and assisting the plaintiff.58 A more common figure is 
the attorney (attornatus). Attorneys seem usually to have appeared in the place of principal 
parties, and conducted litigation on their behalf. There are examples of single individual 
attorneys handling a number of cases simultaneously for different ‘clients’. For instance, in 
1342 at one session of the court of Cannock and Rugeley (Staffordshire) there were eleven 
personal actions pending. In four of these, Thomas Clerk was attorney for the plaintiff, that is, 
for a different plaintiff in each case. At a session later that year there were ten personal actions 
pending, in four of which Hugh Gentill acted as attorney for four different plaintiffs.59 
                                                          
documentation: P.R. Schofield, ‘Seals: Administration and Law’, in P.R. Schofield and E.A. 
New, eds., Seals and Society: Medieval Wales, the Welsh Marches and their English Border 
Region, Cardiff, 2016, 43.  
58 Farewell, Staffordshire, court of 14 Nov. 1290, Paternoster v Prencut, Lichfield Record 
Office, D30/4/4/3r; Norton Canon, Herefordshire, court of 14 March 1306, Tayllour v Norton, 
Hereford Cathedral Library, R900, m. 2; Redgrave, court of 21 Jan. 1261, Paumer v Stebbing, 
University of Chicago Joseph Regenstein Library, Bacon MS 1. 




Attorneys are much more frequently noted than narratores, but even their explicit 
involvement is evidenced in only a minority of personal actions overall. For instance, only one 
of the 214 personal actions recorded in the court rolls of Fornham St Martin (Suffolk) between 
1272 and 1307 mentions an attorney.60 Furthermore, the background of such men is obscure, 
and it is not clear how far attorneys brought experience of non-manorial jurisdictions to their 
work. Some attorneys were clearly local tenants or neighbours appointed for reasons of 
convenience, rather than outsiders hired for their expertise. 
That said, given the level of sophistication regularly exhibited in pleading manorial 
personal actions, one cannot rule out the involvement of legal experts whose role is not 
explicitly noted in the court records.61 There are occasional hints that lawyers might have acted 
routinely in many manor courts but would not normally be mentioned in the rolls unless there 
was a specific reason to do so. An example of this is a debt case brought in 1339 at Romsley 
(Worcestershire) by William de Herthull against Margery la Deye. William argued that 
Margery, whose name suggests that she was a dairymaid, had merely denied the debt and ‘did 
not defend in form of law, even though she could have had counsel in court’.62 The reference 
raises the possibility of wider unrecorded involvement of such ‘counsel’ in this and other 
tribunals. 
Furthermore, evidence additional to the court rolls themselves exists to suggest that 
trained lawyers possessing knowledge of a range of jurisdictions participated in manorial civil 
                                                          
60 Briggs and Schofield, ‘Understanding’, 133. 
61 Schofield, ‘Peasants, Litigation and Agency’. 
62 …desicut ipsa potuit habuisse consilium in Curia: Romsley, court of 17 Dec. 1339, Herthull 
v la Deye, Birmingham City Archives, 346809; M. Tompkins ed., Court Rolls of Romsley 
1279-1643, Worcestershire Historical Society New Ser., 27, 2017, 113. 
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litigation. This is the French guide to pleading in personal actions which begins ‘Each manner 
of wrong can be pleaded in two ways, namely by writ or by plaint’ (‘Chescune manere de 
trespas put estre pledee en deus maneres, nomement par bref ou par pleynt’). This unpublished 
treatise of the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century exists in two versions. A longer version 
survives in at least eight manuscripts, while a shorter version is known in just two.63 The 
treatise describes the various stages of a personal action, moves on to pleading and exceptions, 
and concludes with sample counts (a ‘count’ was the plaintiff’s opening complaint) and 
defences. The longer version focuses on debt and covenant, and the shorter version on trespass, 
but taken together the two versions consider every type of personal action. This work is clearly 
concerned with litigation in manor courts, since at several points its contents relate explicitly 
to practice in ‘courts baron’, i.e. manorial or seigniorial courts, and it is entitled ‘Court Baroun’ 
in several manuscripts. 
                                                          
63 Longer version: Harvard Law School, MS. 162, ff. 174r-187v; Cambridge University 
Library, Ee.2.19, ff. 133r-139v; Cambridge University Library, Mm.1.27, f. 143v (beginning 
only); Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Ashmole 1276, ff. 165r-205v; Bodleian Library, MS. 
Rawlinson C.459, ff. 197r-218v; Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson C.507, ff. 153-183; Dorset 
Record Office, DC/BTB/G/1, pp. 330-368; Sydney Univ. Lib., Nicholson MS. (not consulted). 
Shorter version: British Library, Egerton MS. 656, ff. 188v-192v; British Library, Royal MS. 
9 A. VII, ff. 219v-227r. See J.H. Baker and J. Ringrose, Catalogue of English Legal 
Manuscripts in Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, 1996, 179-180, 476. Beckerman, 
‘Customary law’, 276-345, provides an edition and discussion of both versions of the treatise 
based on the Harvard MS and the two British Library MSS. For a discussion of the dating of 
the tract, see D.J. Ibbetson, ‘Sale of Goods in the Fourteenth Century’, 107 Law Quarterly 
Review (1991), 492 n. 47. 
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There is consensus that this treatise is a product of the instruction of apprentice lawyers 
in London c.1300.64 It includes pedagogical phrases: ‘fet asaver’, ‘Jeo pos qe’, ‘ore orrez vous’ 
(‘let it be known’, ‘suppose’, ‘now hear’). The work is a guide, probably generated from 
‘lecture notes’ for the benefit of those expecting to work as pleaders. The treatise suggests that 
at least some of that work would be in manorial courts. The Chescune manere treatise is thus 
distinct from other contemporary works on the manor court, namely the treatises on holding 
courts, already mentioned, and the formularies which provide sample court rolls. Those latter 
texts are aimed not at pleaders, but at either the court’s steward, its clerk, or both.65 The 
Chescune manere treatise, by contrast, is aimed at pleaders in personal actions. Furthermore, 
and crucially, the Chescune manere treatise is not concerned exclusively with manor court 
plaints.66 As noted, the treatise starts by saying that every manner of trespass can be pleaded 
in two ways, by plaint and by writ. The reference to plaints shows the treatise’s relevance to 
                                                          
64 J.S. Beckerman, ‘Law-writing and Law Teaching: Treatise Evidence of the Formal Teaching 
of English Law in the Late Thirteenth Century’, in J.A. Bush and A. Wijffels, eds., Learning 
the Law. The Teaching and Transmission of Law in England, 1150-1900, London, 1999; Brand, 
Origins, 114-115. Beckerman’s is the fullest available study of the treatise, but further research 
on the manuscripts is needed. For the London law school, see P. Brand, ‘Learning English 
Customary Law: Education in the London Law School, 1250-1500’, in O. Weijers, ed., 
Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle ages and Renaissance, Turnhout, 1995. 
65 E.g. the texts in Maitland and Baildon, eds., Court Baron; also the MSS cited in Baker and 
Ringrose, Catalogue of English Legal Manuscripts, 346; also that printed in Legal and 
manorial formularies edited…in memory of Julius Parnell Gilson, Oxford, 1933 (British 
Library, MS Add. 41201). 
66 On this point see also Ibbetson, ‘Sale of Goods’, 492. 
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manor court practice. But the treatise also never loses sight of cases begun by writ, which is 
how personal actions were typically initiated in the royal courts. There are several points where 
the treatise points to differences in procedure depending on whether the matter is begun by 
plaint or writ. For example, there are two forms of an exception to a count based on variation, 
one when the matter is pleaded by plaint, one when it is by writ. Actions begun by writ also 
appear among the sample counts, for example a plea of replevin by writ. Numerous incidental 
references also show that the treatise is not just about manor courts. There are asides on royal 
court practices. In two instances in the shorter version, sample counts are distinguished 
according to setting. One starts ‘Count by plaint in the court of the king or the county’, another 
starting ‘count without writ in the court baron’.67 
The Chescune manere treatise thus points to the existence in our period of an education 
designed to assist lawyers in conducting personal actions in a range of curial settings, of which 
the manor courts were just one. The treatise cannot reveal how far lawyers’ careers did actually 
involve such shifting between manorial and non-manorial jurisdictions applying a broadly 
similar set of pleading techniques. However, if this did occur to any great extent, then it would 
clearly have acted to tie together the different types of jurisdiction concerned with personal 
actions into a homogeneous network.68 
                                                          
67 Beckerman, ‘Customary Law’, 329, 341. 
68 Palmer, County Courts, 300-301, argued for seeing the legal profession as a ‘living bond 
between the various levels of courts’, but his focus was primarily on the communality of 
personnel in county courts and royal courts; see also R. C. Palmer, ‘The Origins of the Legal 
Profession in England’, 11 Irish Jurist (1976), 126. 
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The treatise focuses on the technicalities of court process relating to exceptions, rules 
of essoins, counting and defence, and waging law (i.e. compurgation).69 Such concerns also 
surface in many manor court cases in the court rolls themselves, as examples presented in 
earlier sections show. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the close attention to correct 
form and process evident in manor court litigation was entirely the result of participation of 
external legal professionals. Yet we should remember that although our surviving court rolls 
yield many examples of the objections, exceptions and clever legal points that could be 
employed in civil litigation, very few of these are explicitly attributed to professional attorneys 
or pleaders. The influence of such professionals was very likely greater than it appears from 
the record. Yet this does not rule out the likelihood that some of the sophisticated legal 
argument we observe came from the ordinary manorial litigants themselves, and not from an 
unrecorded legal adviser. 
Virtually all such litigants acted at other times as ordinary manor court suitors, while 
many also served as jurors in manorial personal actions, and they clearly developed legal 
expertise and judgement in these capacities also. This point is neatly revealed in a trespass case 
in the manor court of Ruyton-XI-Towns (Shropshire), in which the plaintiff’s count was 
followed by a request to the steward from the defendant for permission to confer with his legal 
counsel (consilium), which he then did, apparently leaving the courtroom. The plaintiff 
objected to this move on the grounds that he also needed to grant permission, and sought a 
judgment as to whether his opponent’s actions were faulty on procedural grounds. Rather like 
the example from Romsley cited above, this case is thus noteworthy and unusual in accidentally 
                                                          
69 Interestingly, in light of the discussion in section IV above, the treatise’s treatment of essoins 
recognizes local autonomy, discussing some general rules, but also noting that ‘in diverse 
courts there are diverse usages’. 
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revealing something of the role of lawyers and the court steward in trespass litigation. What is 
perhaps even more interesting, however, is the fact that the procedural point was referred to 
the judgment of the court, and that the ‘whole court’ (tota curia) decided that the defendant 
had indeed made an error, and should lose the case. It was the villagers, as suitors, and not the 
steward or the lawyer, who were deemed to possess the knowledge and experience required to 
make a decision in this case.70 
Of course, if decision-making about how to handle personal actions lay as much with 
the local court suitors as it did with the ‘experts’, one might imagine that this would lead to 
diversity and idiosyncrasy among courts, not uniformity. The case of essoins, discussed earlier, 
suggests room for procedural variation according to local custom. However, we should recall 
that in making or weighing legal arguments as litigants, jurors or suitors, villagers drew on 
knowledge and techniques observed and learned in other, non-manorial jurisdictional contexts, 
as well as in their own and neighbouring manor courts.71 Such arguments could occasionally 
draw explicitly on legal practice beyond the bounds of the manor. Thus the court record tells 
us that when in 1315 at Bressingham Nicholas Wyte sued John Joye about an alleged trespass 
in the village, ‘John came and did not deny the words of the court [i.e. make a correct defence] 
                                                          
70 Ruyton, Shropshire, court of 26 Feb. 1336, Yonge v Broun, Shropshire Archives, 6000 /7401, 
m. 6r. For another example from the same location of the ‘whole court’ stating a rule in a 
personal action, see Shropshire Archives, 6000 /7401, mm. 3, 4r, 23 Nov. 1335 (plaintiff in 
trespass is required only to narrate the basis of his claim at the first court, not repeatedly 
thereafter). 




as is the custom of the realm’.72 We do not know who made this objection and thereby pointed 
to the necessity of following wider practice, and although the record does not say so, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that it was made by the steward or an unrecorded lawyer. More likely, 
however, is that it was the plaintiff, Nicholas, who had made the objection, since he went on to 
win his case by claiming that this failing had left John undefended. A similar insistence on the 
importance of following wider practice is evident in a 1279 debt case from Hevingham 
(Norfolk), in which the plaintiff’s attempt to wage his law was successfully challenged by the 
defendant because ‘he does not have the book [i.e. the bible] to make his law, as he should 
according to the law of England’.73 
Indeed, rather than demonstrating the existence of highly localized preoccupations, the 
evidence frequently suggests that the same legal points cropped up repeatedly in different 
locations as part of the pleading of personal actions, in spite of the heavy lay involvement in 
proceedings. The possibility exists that manorial litigants made these points not because their 
lawyers advised them to, but because they had personal knowledge of their circulation in a 
wider range of legal contexts. A good example is the tendency for defendants to object that 
they should not be required to respond to an opponent’s claim, on the grounds that he or she 
had failed to specify in his or her count the date or location of the alleged wrong or disputed 
contract. Several cases from both western and eastern counties include this exception, which 
took a very similar form in all instances and usually resulted in the collapse of the plaintiff’s 
claim and the defendant going sine die. At least seven such cases record the defendant 
excepting on the basis of the plaintiff’s omission of date or place (or both), and also state that 
                                                          
72 Norfolk Record Office, WAR 5, m. 6r, court of 26 Sept. 1314. 
73 Norfolk Record Office, NRS 14634, court of 7 Oct. 1279, 15 Feb. 1280, de Middelton v Kep. 
The plaintiff had waged his law following his reply to his opponent’s defence. 
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the defendant was ‘present’ in making his or her defence, or at least make no mention of an 
attorney or other legal counsel. This latter feature implies that the defendant was acting on his 
or her own initiative when making the defence. It provides evidence against the suggestion that 
this exception cropped up in a similar form in different manorial settings purely as a result of 
the work of lawyers drawing on a shared education or training, though the importance of 
including the date and location in a plaintiff’s count would have been known to those lawyers 
whom we presume to be the primary audience of the Chescune manere treatise.74 Furthermore, 
in all seven instances, the case was referred to ‘the court’ for a decision following the 
defendant’s exception, which shows again that the suitors at large, rather than any experts 
present in the court, were perceived as a key source of legal authority.75 
                                                          
74 For sample counts in the treatise which include this information, see Beckerman, ‘Customary 
law’, 295, 307, 308, 309, 317, etc. 
75 Bockleton, Worcestershire, court of 22 Jan. 1323, Atkynes v Algar, Staffordshire Record 
Office, D(W)1788/P39.B10; Tardebigge, Worcestershire, court of 30 March 1318, Lourdebene 
v le Marchald, Worcestershire Record Office, b 705.128, Box 12/2; Preston-on-Wye, 
Herefordshire, court of 4 July 1306, Atenasse v Carewardin, Hereford Cathedral Library, 
R827a; Heacham, Norfolk, court of ?30 June 1286, Hou v Baule, Norfolk Record Office, Le 
Strange, DA2; Redgrave, Suffolk, court of 19 June 1266, Chantecler v Iumpe, University of 
Chicago Joseph Regenstein Library, Bacon MS 1; Great Waltham and High Easter, Essex, 
court held at Pleshey 30 June 1296, de Valences v Reynold, The National Archives, DL 
30/62/769; and the Nov. 1304 case from Norton Canon, n. 27 above. A further three cases note 
the exception based on the omission of date and place, and imply that the defendant appeared 
and made a defence in person, but do not explicitly state that the ‘court’ made a decision on 
the defendant’s exception: Preston-on-Wye, Herefordshire, court of 1 Dec. 1308, Kaunt v 
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Overall, then, it is perhaps safest to conclude that a broadly shared set of practices 
concerning the conduct of manor court litigation emerged in this period, and that this was partly 
achieved through the channelling of expert knowledge from beyond each manor, but also with 
the full participation of ordinary laypeople acting as officials, litigants and suitors. Such people 
might define a practice as correct not because it was local manorial custom, but because they 
had learned of it through their experience in a range of external legal settings. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
The manorial personal actions mattered because they were the primary means by which many 
thousands of English households enforced debt repayment, recovered detained goods, defended 
their reputations, and secured damages for minor injuries and petty infringements of their 
property rights. Litigation of this kind represented one of the most important settings in which 
ordinary medieval people engaged with and made use of the law. We have seen that by the end 
of the first century for which court rolls exist, the individual manorial jurisdictions we have 
examined were operating in broadly the same fashion where personal actions were concerned. 
It is true that at the micro level, the precise manner in which crucial procedures were carried 
out still retained the potential to vary idiosyncratically from court to court, with possibly 
important effects.76 Furthermore, there are signs that progress towards curial ‘convergence’ 
was less smooth in the west of England than it was in the east. Yet at the macro level, it is the 
                                                          
Kaunt, Hereford Cathedral Library, R829; Lakenheath, Suffolk, court of 5 April 1317, 
Criteman v Gere, Cambridge University Library, EDC 7/16, roll 6; Leiston, Suffolk, court of 
5 Dec. 1295, le Colyere v Bygot et al., Cambridge University Library, Vanneck MSS Box 9, 
roll 2. 
76 Briggs, ‘Manor Court Procedures’. 
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similarities among manors (and their records) that are more striking than the differences. A 
litigant familiar with the workings of his local manor court would probably have been able to 
go into most other manor courts in lowland England and make sense of civil proceedings; many 
undoubtedly did so. The influence driving this broad uniformity was neither central authority, 
nor ‘the common law’, in the sense of a system of rules deliberately communicated in a top-
down fashion. Nor does it seem to have had much to do with the actions of landlords, who 
cannot be shown to have been especially interested in the interpersonal litigation of the 
peasantry. The type of landlord, whether clerical or secular, provides no obvious clues to 
explaining the patterns in manor court litigation procedures captured in our Appendix, which 
seem rather to show a larger contrast between regions. Undoubtedly the court stewards, many 
of them experienced lawyers, exercised a role in overseeing court business as a whole and 
directing the manner in which it was written down by the clerk or scribe. However, there is 
little to show that the stewards interfered in the conduct of individual lawsuits. 
Instead, the growing convergence of manor courts in the handling of the personal 
actions reflects the homogenizing influence of shared legal knowledge. This appears to have 
seeped into manor courts partly through the shadowy presence of lawyers who may have been 
trained to work in a variety of different jurisdictions – though undoubtedly with the expectation 
that they would be working mainly in the royal courts - and can occasionally be glimpsed 
making arguments in manorial litigation. One obvious conclusion to draw is that such legal 
professionals may have been earlier to appear and thicker on the ground in eastern England 
than in the western counties, and that this might explain some of the contrast between the two 
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regions.77 Yet explicit evidence of the work of lawyers in manor courts is too fragmentary to 
justify an exclusive focus on them, and we should also emphasize the contribution of 
experienced villagers whose work as litigants, officials and suitors did so much to determine 
how the courts would operate. When we can observe disagreements arising in court concerning 
the correct rule or procedure to follow in disputes over private wrongs and agreements, it was 
very often the views of individual litigants or those of the ‘whole court’ that carried the day, 
and rarely those of the stewards or lawyers. We might speculate further that eastern England’s 
comparatively high concentration of free tenants possessing experience of the common law 
courts could have been a factor in the contrast between the two regions. 
 Ultimately, of course, the manor courts were seigniorial institutions. In the century and 
a half after 1350, demographic stagnation combined with the decline of serfdom and 
manorialism more generally meant that landlords had less use for their manor courts. In many 
places they were held less frequently, and their machinery became less efficient. A knock-on 
effect of this was that these tribunals become less attractive than they had been before the black 
death as a venue for interpersonal litigation. Numbers of manorial lawsuits brought to manorial 
courts plummeted in the mid-fifteenth century, as debt and trespass plaintiffs sought out other, 
less moribund jurisdictions.78 Thus the shifting fortunes of the manor court as an institution of 
seigniorial authority in the end determined whether it could thrive as a setting for the personal 
actions. Yet this does not detract from the importance of the fact that in the century under 
                                                          
77 For an analogous contrast between eastern and western England, in this case in the emergence 
of a peasant land market, see P.R. Hyams, ‘The Origins of a Peasant Land Market in England’, 
23 Economic History Review (1970), 18. 
78 C. Briggs, ‘The Availability of Credit in the English Countryside 1400-1480’, 56 
Agricultural History Review (2008), 1. 
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consideration here, the success of the manor court jurisdiction over personal actions represents 
the successful building of legal institutions ‘from below’ by people - free and villein, male and 
female - who had extensive knowledge of law courts, including royal law courts, lying beyond 
the boundaries of their own manors. One might suspect that the resulting institutions were not 
necessarily always impartial, or intended to benefit the interests of the whole of rural society, 
as opposed to the village elites who no doubt controlled manorial juries and offices, and 
brought a great deal of the litigation to the courts. Yet Maitland’s assessment that manorial 
jurisdiction over personal actions was ‘a useful, thriving reality’ is undoubtedly correct. We 
should add that jurisdiction to the list of medieval English institutions of governance and law 
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